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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 










vs. Case No. 17603 
TURHAN S. DOGU, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for divorce brought by Plaintiff-
Appellant, Edith Ellen Dogu, against Defendant-Respondent, 
Turhan S. Dogu. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Weber County, the Honorable 
Ronald 0. Hyde presiding sitting without a jury, granted a 
Decree of Divorce to Plaintiff-Appellant, hereinafter referred 
to as the "Wife", on the basis of "minimal grounds" as agreed 
to between the parties (T. 88). Defendant-Respondent, here-
inafter referred to as the "Husband", presented no grounds 
for divorce, although representing that the case was "two-
sided" (T. 88). 
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Custody of the 17-year old daughter of the parties 
was awarded to the Wife and the Husband was ordered to pay 
$200 per month child support. The Wife was awarded $1,500 
per month alimony and upon Husband's retirement, said 
alimony was to be automatically reduced to $750 per month. 
The family home in Ogden was to be sold and the 
net proceeds were to be divided equally between the parties 
after the payment of the first mortgage and swimming pool debt. 
Real property in Palm Coast, Florida was to be sold and the 
proceeds divided equally between the parties. Each party was 
awarded one-half of any interest the parties might have in a 
condominium in Turkey. 
Wife was awarded savings certificates, bank accounts, 
and corporate stock, with a total value of $23,450. She was 
also awarded a 1976 Chevrolet Monza. 
Husband was awarded savings accounts of $2, 205, bank 
accounts in his professional corporation of $26,308, a 1977 
Cadillac, and his retirement benefits. 
Husband was to pay the debts of the marriage and 
each party was ordered to pay his own attorney's fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Husband (Respondent) seeks an affirmation of the 
trial court's judgment. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts does not fully 
set forth the facts established at the trial, states in-
correctly certain facts, and leaves out vital testimony 
having a bearing upon the issues on appeal. 
The parties were married to each other on August 10, 
1957 in Indiana (T. 88). The Husband was a medical doctor at 
the time of this marriage. Three children were born of the 
marriage, two of whom are emancipated, and a 17-year old 
daughter, Kismet, who resides with the Wife (T.89). Kismet 
is employed by her father, and she is paid $225 per month 
for her work there (T. 130 & 136). The 20-year old son of 
the parties is studying to become a commercial pilot and the 
Husband pays more than $500 per month for the son's .. education 
and support which will continue for three and one-half years 
(T. 136). The Husband plans to support Kismet while she is 
in college (T. 137). 
Earlier in the marriage, the parties together 
owned a home in Latrobe, Pennsylvania. Contrary to the 
Wife's Brief, this home was owned by both of the parties, 
rather than just the Wife (T. 90). In 1977, they sold this 
home, together with a summer cottage in Pennsylvania, for 
which they received in excess of $60,000, which they divided 
equally between them (T. 90 & R. 27). Each of the parties 
-3-
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put $10,000 of this money into the acquisition of the family 
home in Ogden and the Wife put $20, 000 into savings certificates 
which she still owns (T. 92). The substantial part of the 
Husband's remaining $20,000 went to move the family from 
Pennsylvania to Utah and for living expenses for the family 
until he was able to establish his practice in Utah (T. 140), 
In 1962, while living in Turkey, the parties purchased I 
a condominium there at a cost of approximately $5, 000 American I 
money (T. 96 & 123). The Wife testified that she has no idea I 
of the value of the condo but guesses that it might be worth 
somewhere around $50,000 (T. 96). The Husband testified that 
the condo may be worth $200,500 Turkish lira to as high as 
a million Turkish lira. One dollar is worth about 70 Turkish 
lira, so that his estimate would be between $2,864 and $14,285 
American money (T. 1232. He testified elsewhere that it may 
have a value of around $30, 000 (T. 124). Both of the parties 
are now citizens of the United States (T. 91) and as such, 
they cannot own real property in Turkey (T. 155). The 
condo was transferred to the Husband's sisters who have lived 
in it for many years without any contributions to its upkeep 
having been made by the parties (T. 124). The Wife does not 
desire to deprive the Husband's family of the use of the 
condo (T. 96). 
The assets of the parties at the time of the trial 
consisted of the following: 
-4- d 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(a) The family home in Ogden which was 
appraised for $121,000 (R. 43) and has since 
been sold for $122,000. The court ordered 
that the net proceeds be divided equally 
between the parties (T. 164 & R. 79). After 
the payment of the debt against the home of 
approximately $78,000 (T. 129), the parties 
will each receive $22,000 from which they must 
each pay one-half of the costs of sale. 
(b) A lot at Palm Coast, Florida which 
cost $14,200 in 1964 and on which there is a 
balance owing of $3,500, with the Husband 
making payments of $175 per month (T. 138 & 139). 
The court ordered that this property be sold and 
the proceeds divided equally between the parties 
(T. 164 & R. 79). 
(c) Bank accounts, savings certificates, and 
E. F. Hutton stock in possession of Wife having a 
total value of $23,450 (T. 93, T. 104, & R. 40). 
These assets, together with the 1976 Monza, were 
awarded to the Wife (T. 163 & R. 80). 
(d) Husband's accounts at McKay-Dee Hospital 
Credit Union totaling $2,205 (T. 140). These were 
awarded to the Husband (T. 164 & R. 80). 
-5-
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(e) Bank accounts and savings certificates 
owned by Husband's professional corporation totalino 
0 
$26,308 (T. 141). There will be a substantial tax 
liability against these accounts when withdrawn from 
the professional corporation (T. 142). These were 
awarded to the Husband (T. 164 & R. 80). 
(f) The Husband has acquired certain retire-
ment benefits over the years. These consist of a 
TIAA and a CREF account created while the Husband was 
a medical school professor in Pennsylvania. There 
is now approximately $27 ,000 in these two accounts 
(T. 142) . These accounts were contributed one-half 
by the university and one-half by the Husband, and 
he cannot withdraw the accounts until he turns 65 
years of age (T. 142). The Husband has a Keogh 
retirement program through Prudential Life Insurance 
Company of $10,075 which cannot be withdrawn until 
retirement (T. 143). 
There is also a pension and profit sharing 
trust set up through the Husband's professional 
corporation in which there is a total of $49,655 
deposited in certificate and savings accounts. 
This cannot be withdrawn until retirement (T. 143) · 
The Husband did not set up the pension and profit 
-6-
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sharing trust until three years ago and because of 
his advanced age, he made sizable contributions 
to the trust during those years (T. 144). The 
Husband was awarded his retirement benefits (T. 163 & 
R. 80). 
The Statement of Facts in the Wife's Brief over-
states the Husband's savings and retirement benefits by a 
substantial amount (See page 4 of Wife's Brief). Her 
statement that there was $45,000 in timeway certificates and 
that another $25,000 was added to that account is incorrect. 
There were initially two $10,000 savings certificates to which 
another $25,000 was added, making a total of $45,000 (T. 119). 
By the time of the trial, that was increased to a total of 
$49,655, which is the total amount in the pension and profit 
sharing trust (T. 143). The Wife's statement that there is 
$10,000 in a Keogh account and $10,075 in a Prudential 
Insurance Company annuity is incorrect. These are one and 
the same investment (T. 143). 
The Husband's taxable income in 1977 was $36,973 
and in 1978 it was $60,854 (T. 147). At the present time, 
he is employed by his professional corporation and draws a 
salary of $4,200 per month and, in addition, takes bonuses 
as needed and available (T. 127 & 128). In 1979, he withdrew 
from the corporation as salary and bonus a total of $108,675 
(T. 148} but in order to do so, he drew $9,700 more than 
-7-
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the corporation had available and the professional corporation 
therefore, suffered a loss of $9,700 (T. 151). In 1979, the 
parties paid $35,897 of federal income tax and $4,448 of 
state income tax, using income averaging (T. 149). Because of 
the change in deductions and income averaging, the Husband's 
taxes will be substantially higher in the future (T. 150). 
The Husband was a 56-year old anesthesiologist at 
the time of the trial (T. 90). In 1978, he suffered a stroke 
known as a transient isometric attack and was also hospitalized 
for double vision (T. 151). 
The Husband is working between 60 to 110 hours per 
week (T. 152) and with his health condition, he cannot 
continue that pace (T. 153). It is anticipated that another 
anesthesiologist will be hired which will further cut back 
the Husband's working hours (T. 152). 
The Wife intends to work (T. 90) and is attending 
business college (T. 102), and expects to be employed in 
about a year from the trial date of August 27, 1980 (T. 103) · 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DIVISION OF ASSETS BY THE COURT WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE AND 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE COURT 
-8-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the case of Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378, 431 
P.2d 802 (1967) this court stated: 
"In reviewing the trial court's order in 
divorce proceedings there are certain well 
established principles to be borne in mind. The 
findings and order are endowed with a presumption 
of validity, and the burden is upon the appellant 
to show they are in error. Even though our consti-
tutional provision, Section 9 of Article VIII, 
states that in equity cases this court may review 
the facts, we nevertheless take into account the 
advantaged position of the trial judge. Accord-
ingly, we recognize that it is his prerogative to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and in 
case of conflict, we assume that the trial court 
believed the evidence which supports the findings. 
We review the whole evidence in the light most 
favorable to them; and we will not disturb them 
merely because this court might have viewed the 
matter differently, but only if the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings." 
The Wife has not borne the burden of overcoming 
the presumption of validity of the court's finding and order. 
The court divided the equities in all of the real property 
equally between the parties. The Wife does not appear to 
object to each of the parties receiving one-half of the proceeds 
of the Ogden home and a like division of the Florida property, 
but she complains of the court's order regarding the condo-
minium in Turkey. The court, however, wisely recognized that 
the Turkey condo is somewhat of an unknown quantity. The 
parties paid a total of $5,000 to acquire it but neither of 
them own it at the present time because of prohibitions against 
non-Turkish citizens owning real estate there. It's present 
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value is speculative, with the Husband testifying that it's 
value in American money may be as low as $2, 864 and as high 
as $30,000, and the Wife making a wild guess that it may be 
worth as much as $50, 000. The court correctly ordered that 
if either party was able to exercise ownership over the 
Turkey condo, then each party was to be awarded a one-half 
interest therein (R. 79). This is consistent with the Wife's 
request set out in her Exhibit 1 (R. 40) that the Turkey cone 
be sold and the proceeds divided equally. If, and when, the 
parties can exercise ownership control over the condo, that i 
very thing will be done. There was no evidence presented in 
the trial that this property is in any way an asset of the 
parties at the present time. 
The remaining assets, exclusive of the Husband's 
retirement benefits, consisted primarily of bank accounts, 
savings certificates, and stock. The Wife was awarded such 
accounts totaling $23, 600. The Husband received credit union 
accounts in his own name of $2, 205 and accounts and certifier 
in his professional corporation totaling $26, 308. When such 
funds are withdrawn from the corporation, they will be subje;: 
to substantial income taxes which will reduce them to the 
point that the savings of the Wife and those of the Husband 
will be substantially comparable. 
Each of the parties was awarded an automobile, his 
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Cadillac having somewhat more value than her Chevrolet, but 
this having been off set by her having received the substantial 
part of the household furniture and furnishings. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION 
IN AWARDING THE RETIREMENT BENEFITS TO HUSBAND 
AND REQUIRING HIM TO PAY ALIMONY AFTER HIS RETIREMENT 
The court correctly considered the ages, health 
conditions, earning capacities, and child support needs of the 
parties, and awarded the Wife $18,000 per year alimony and 
$2,400 per year child support. In addition, the Husband pays 
over $6,000 per year for the support and education of his 
aviation-student son. This amounts to over $26,000 per year 
in support responsibilities. In addition, the Husband was 
ordered to pay the mortgage payment on the house of $469 per 
month and payment of $175 per month on the Florida lot, until 
those properties are sold (R. 801. 
This court, in the case of Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 
79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956} stated that: 
"The court's responsibility is to endeavor 
to provide a just and equitable adjustment of 
their economic resources so that the parties 
can reconstruct their lives on a happy and use-
ful basis." 
The Wife in this case is beginning anew with $23,600 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of savings and stock, well over $20,000 from the proceeds of 
the Ogden home and the Florida property, household furnitun 
and furnishings, $18, 000 per year alimony, and any income she 
might earn upon completion of her business school training. 
This should be more than sufficient to enable her to recon-
struct her life "on a happy and useful basis". 
The Wife's implication that the $25, 000 of account: 
receivable from the Husband's medical practice is a 
marital asset is not valid. This is part of the Husband's 
future income, on which he must pay income taxes and from 
which he must pay the Wife's alimony. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the Husband 
should be awarded his retirement benefits, consisting of 
$27,061 in TIAA and CREF, $10,075 in his Keogh plan with 
Prudential Life Insurance, and $49,665 in his pension and 
profit sharing trust. The evidence was that none of these 
funds can be withdrawn until the Husband retires, and 
pursuant to this court's decision in the case of Bennettv. 
Bennett, Utah, 607 P. 2d 839 (1980), the husband's retirement 
benefits should not be considered as one of the assets of~ 
parties. This court suggested in the Bennett case that wheri 
the husband could withdraw the amount of contributions he ha: 
made to his retirement fund at any time prior to 31 days bef: 
he was eligible to retire, that fund might appropriately be 
considered a marital asset. The court specifically ruled, 
-12-
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however, that where the fund cannot be withdrawn until 
retirement, no present value can be assigned thereto, and it 
should not be considered one of the assets of the parties. 
The United States Supreme Court, in the recent 
case of McCarty v. McCarty, 69 L.Ed.2d 589, decided June 26, 
1981, held that military retirement benefits which accrued 
during the parties' marriage and which could not be withdrawn 
until the husband's retirement, were not subject to division 
between the parties and should be awarded solely to the 
husband. 
If this court should hold, notwithstanding the pre-
viously cited cases, that the Husband's retirement benefits are 
assets having a present value, the trial court still made a 
fair and equitable decision in awarding those benefits to the 
Husband. This court, in the case of Englert v. Englert, Utah, 
576 P.2d 1274, in.referring to a husband's pension fund or 
insurance, stated: 
"These should be given due consideration 
along with all other assets, income and the 
earnings and the potential earning capacity 
of the parties, in determining what is the 
most practical, just and equitable way to 
serve the best interests and welfare of the 
parties and their children." 
In the present case, the court took the retirement 
benefits into consideration and wisely ruled that rather than 
-13-
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physically divide those benefits between the parties, he 
would require the Husband, after his retirement, to continue 
to pay the Wife alimony of $7 50 per month, or $9, 000 per yea: 
The source from which the alimony will have to be paid at 
that time will be the Husband's retirement benefits. The 
trial judge in stating, "I think the idea that removing thosi 
[retirement benefits] from assets and continuing alimony rnak1 
good sense" (R. 163), did not abuse his discretion, but rath1 
made sound provision for the maintenance of the Wife after 
the Husband's retirement. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court made a fair and equitable award of 
the property of the parties by ordering that the real estate' 
be sold and the net proceeds be divided equally between the 
parties. The remaining assets, consisting of bank accounts, 
stock, automobiles, and household furniture, including thebs 
accounts in the Husband's professional corporation, were al:: 
divided fairly and equitably between the parties on a sub-
stantially 50-50 basis. 
The court made the only feasible order possible 
regarding the condominium in Turkey by granting a one-half 
interest to each of the parties in whatever ownership rights 
the parties have in that property. 
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It was not an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court to award the Husband his retirement benefits and require 
that he use them as a source of paying the Wife substantial 
alimony after his retirement. 
The judgment and decree of the trial court should 
therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
7s/ C. Gerald Parker 
C. Gerald Parker 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of September, 
1981, I mailed two true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing Brief of Defendant-Respondent, by placing the same 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid and addressed to 
the following: 
PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ. 
VLAHOS, PERKINS & SHARP 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(Attorney for Appellant) 
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